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Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment Merchants Association 
08-1448 
Ruling Below: Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2009), 
cert. granted, Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 3573 (2010). 
Governor Schwarzenegger signed into law an Act that imposes civil penalty of up to $1,000 on 
any person that sold or rented a violent video game to a minor. The Act also requires violent 
video games to be labeled as such. Before the Act took effect, various video game associations 
filed suit against the Governor and the State for declaratory relief against the Act on the grounds 
that it unconstitutionally restricted freedom of expression on its face based on content regulation 
and the labeling requirement, was unconstitutionally vague, and violated equal protection. The 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the video game associations and the State of 
California appealed. The State urged the appellate court to extend the “obscenity as to minors” 
standard first mentioned in Ginsberg v. New York, which permitted a state to prohibit the sale of 
sexually explicit material to minors that it could not ban from distribution to adults, to include 
materials containing violence. The appellate court, however, declined to extend Ginsberg and 
held that the Act is a presumptively invalid content-based restriction on speech and strict scrutiny 
remained the applicable review standard. Additionally, the court found that the evidence 
presented by the State did not support the purported interest in preventing psychological or 
neurological harm to minors. None of the research established or suggested a causal link between 
minors playing violent video games and actual psychological or neurological harm, and 
inferences to that effect would not be reasonable. As a result, the State had not met its burden to 
demonstrate a compelling interest. Because the Act was invalid and, as a result, there was no 
state-mandated age threshold for the purchase or rental of video games, the State’s mandated 
label would arguably convey a false statement that certain conduct was illegal when it was not. 
Questions Presented: (1) Does the First Amendment bar a state from restricting the sale of 
violent video games to minors? (2) If the First Amendment applies to violent video games that 
are sold to minors, and the standard of review is strict scrutiny, under Turner Broadcasting 
System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994), is the state required to demonstrate a direct 
causal link between violent video games and physical and psychological harm to minors before 
the state can prohibit the sale of the games to minors? 
VIDEO SOFTWARE DEALERS ASSOCIATION; Entertainment Software Association, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
 
v. 
 
Arnold SCHWARZENEGGER, in his official capacity as Governor State of California; 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., in his official capacity as Attorney General, State of California, 
Defendants-Appellants, and George Kennedy, in his official capacity as Santa Clara 
County District Attorney; Richard Doyle, in his official capacity as City Attorney for the 
City of San Jose; Ann Miller Ravel, in her official capacity as County Counsel for the 
County of Santa Clara, Defendants. 
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United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
Filed February 20, 2009 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge: 
 
Defendants-Appellants California Governor 
Schwarzenegger and California Attorney 
General Brown (the “State”) appeal the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment 
in favor of Plaintiffs-Appellees Video 
Software Dealers Association and 
Entertainment Software Association 
(“Plaintiffs”), and the denial of the State’s 
cross-motion for summary judgment. 
Plaintiffs filed suit for declaratory relief 
seeking to invalidate newly enacted 
California Civil Code sections 1746-1746.5 
(the “Act”), which impose restrictions and a 
labeling requirement on the sale or rental of 
“violent video games” to minors, on the 
grounds that the Act violates rights 
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
 
We hold that the Act, as a presumptively 
invalid content-based restriction on speech, 
is subject to strict scrutiny and not the 
“variable obscenity” standard from Ginsberg 
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). Applying 
strict scrutiny, we hold that the Act violates 
rights protected by the First Amendment 
because the State has not demonstrated a 
compelling interest, has not tailored the 
restriction to its alleged compelling interest, 
and there exist less-restrictive means that 
would further the State’s expressed interests. 
Additionally, we hold that the Act’s labeling 
requirement is unconstitutionally compelled 
speech under the First Amendment because 
it does not require the disclosure of purely 
factual information; but compels the 
carrying of the State’s controversial opinion. 
Accordingly,  we  affirm the  district  court’s 
 
grant of summary judgment to Plaintiffs and 
its denial of the State’s cross-motion. 
Because we affirm the district court on these 
grounds, we do not reach two of Plaintiffs’ 
challenges to the Act: first, that the language 
of the Act is unconstitutionally vague, and, 
second, that the Act violates Plaintiffs’ 
rights under the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
I. 
 
A. 
 
On October 7, 2005, Governor 
Schwarzenegger signed into law Assembly 
Bill 1179 (“AB 1179”), codified at Civil 
Code §§ 1746-1746.5. The Act states that 
“[a] person may not sell or rent a video 
game that has been labeled as a violent 
video game to a minor.” Violators are 
subject to a civil penalty of up to $ 1,000. 
 
* * * 
 
The Act also imposes a labeling 
requirement. It requires that each “violent 
video game” imported into or distributed in 
California must “be labeled with a solid 
white ‘18’ outlined in black,” which shall 
appear on the front face of the game’s 
package and be “no less than 2 inches by 2 
inches” in size. 
 
A.B. 1179 states that the State of California 
has two compelling interests that support the 
Act: (1) “preventing violent, aggressive, and 
antisocial behavior”; and (2) “preventing 
psychological or neurological harm to 
minors who play violent video games.” A.B. 
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1179 also “finds and declares” that: 
 
(a) Exposing minors to depictions of 
violence in video games, including 
sexual and heinous violence, makes 
those minors more likely to 
experience feelings of aggression, to 
experience a reduction of activity in 
the frontal lobes of the brain, and to 
exhibit violent antisocial or 
aggressive behavior. 
 
(b) Even minors who do not commit 
acts of violence suffer psychological 
harm from prolonged exposure to 
violent video games. 
 
The State included in the excerpts of record 
several hundred pages of material on which 
the Legislature purportedly relied in passing 
the Act. While many of the materials are 
social science studies on the asserted impact 
of violent video games on children, other 
documents are varied and include legal 
analyses, general background papers, 
position papers, etc. Dr. Craig Anderson, 
whose work is central to the State’s 
arguments in this case, is listed as an author 
of roughly half of the works included in the 
bibliography. 
 
B. 
 
The content of the video games potentially 
affected by the Act is diverse. Some of the 
games to which the Act might apply are 
unquestionably violent by everyday 
standards, digitally depicting what most 
people would agree amounts to murder, 
torture, or mutilation. . . . 
 
The video game industry has in place a 
voluntary rating system to provide 
consumers and retailers information about 
video   game  content.    The   Entertainment 
 
 
Software Rating Board (“ESRB”), an 
independent, self-regulated body established 
by the Entertainment Software Association, 
rates the content of video games that are 
voluntarily submitted. ESRB assigns each 
game one of six age-specific ratings, ranging 
from “Early Childhood” to “Adults Only.” It 
also assigns to each game one of roughly 
thirty content descriptors, which include 
“Animated Blood,” “Blood and Gore,” 
“Cartoon Violence,” “Crude Humor,” 
“Fantasy Violence,” “Intense Violence,” 
“Language,” “Suggestive Themes,” and 
“Sexual Violence.” 
 
C. 
 
On October 17, 2005, before the Act took 
effect, Plaintiffs filed suit against the 
Governor, the Attorney General, and three 
city and county defendants, all in their 
official capacities, for declaratory relief 
against the Act on the grounds that it 
violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs argued 
that the Act unconstitutionally restricted 
freedom of expression on its face based on 
content regulation and the labeling 
requirement, was unconstitutionally vague, 
and violated equal protection. 
 
The district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion 
for a preliminary injunction. Video Software 
Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 401 F. 
Supp. 2d 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 
Subsequently, the parties filed cross-motions 
for summary judgment. The district court 
granted Plaintiffs’ motion and denied the 
State’s cross-motion. The district court’s 
summary judgment order invalidated the Act 
under strict scrutiny, and did not reach 
Plaintiffs’ claims regarding vagueness, equal 
protection, or the Act’s labeling 
requirement. The district court permanently 
enjoined enforcement of  the Act.  The  State 
 
 
5 
 
timely appealed. 
 
II. 
 
* * * 
 
III. 
 
[The Court concludes that the entire Act is 
not invalidated even though the State 
concedes on appeal that the alternate 
definition of a “violent video game” in 
section 1746(d)(1)(B) is unconstitutionally 
broad. The remaining provisions can be 
severed.] 
 
IV. 
 
Our next task is to determine what level of 
scrutiny to apply in reviewing the Act’s 
prohibitions. . . . 
 
The Supreme Court has stated that “minors 
are entitled to a significant measure of First 
Amendment protection, and only in 
relatively narrow and well-defined 
circumstances may government bar public 
dissemination of protected materials to 
them.” The State does not contest that video 
games are a form of expression protected by 
the First Amendment. It is also undisputed 
that the Act seeks to restrict expression in 
video games based on its content. 
 
“Content-based regulations are 
presumptively invalid.” We ordinarily 
review content-based restrictions on 
protected expression under strict scrutiny, 
and thus, to survive, the Act “must be 
narrowly tailored to promote a compelling 
Government interest.” “If a less restrictive 
alternative would serve the Government’s 
purpose, the legislature must use that 
alternative.” 
 
The State,  however, urges us to depart from 
 
this framework because the Act concerns 
minors. It argues that we should analyze the 
Act’s restrictions under what has been called 
the “variable obscenity” or “obscenity as to 
minors” standard first mentioned in 
Ginsberg [v. New York]. In essence, the 
State argues that the Court’s reasoning in 
Ginsberg that a state could prohibit the sale 
of sexually-explicit material to minors that it 
could not ban from distribution to adults 
should be extended to materials containing 
violence. This presents an invitation to re-
consider the boundaries of the legal concept 
of “obscenity” under the First Amendment. 
 
In Ginsberg, the Court held that New York 
State could prohibit the sale of sexually-
explicit material to minors that was defined 
by statute as obscene because of its appeal to 
minors. Therefore, the state could prohibit 
the sale of “girlie magazines” to minors 
regardless of the fact that the material was 
not considered obscene for adults. The Court 
stated that “[t]o sustain the power to exclude 
material defined as obscenity by [the statute] 
requires only that we be able to say that it 
was not irrational for the legislature to find 
that exposure to material condemned by the 
statute is harmful to minors.” The Court 
offered two justifications for applying this 
rational basis standard: (1) that 
“constitutional interpretation has 
consistently recognized that the parents’ 
claim to authority in their own household to 
direct the rearing of their children is basic in 
the structure of our society”; and (2) the 
state’s “independent interest in the 
wellbeing of its youth.” 
 
The State suggests that the justifications 
underlying Ginsberg should apply to the 
regulation of violent content as well as 
sexually explicit material. The assertion, 
however, fails when we consider the 
category of material to which the Ginsberg 
decision  applies and  the  First  Amendment 
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principles in which that decision was rooted. 
 
Ginsberg is specifically rooted in the 
Court’s First Amendment obscenity 
jurisprudence, which relates to non-
protected sex-based expression—not violent 
content, which is presumably protected by 
the First Amendment. Ginsberg explicitly 
states that the New York statute under 
review “simply adjusts the definition of 
obscenity to social realities by permitting the 
appeal of this type of material to be assessed 
in term of the sexual interests of such 
minors.” The definition of obscenity that 
Ginsberg adjusted was the Court’s obscenity 
test announced in Roth v. United States, 
which dealt with obscene materials defined 
with reference to sex. The Ginsberg Court 
applied a rational basis test to the statute at 
issue because it placed the magazines at 
issue within a sub-category of obscenity—
obscenity as to minors—that had been 
determined to be not protected by the First 
Amendment, and it did not create an entirely 
new category of expression excepted from 
First Amendment protection. The State, in 
essence, asks us to create a new category of 
non-protected material based on its 
depiction of violence. 
 
The Supreme Court has carefully limited 
obscenity to sexual content. Although the 
Court has wrestled with the precise 
formulation of the legal test by which it 
classifies obscene material, it has 
consistently addressed obscenity with 
reference to sex-based material. Such was 
the case in Roth and Memoirs v. 
Massachusetts, which modified Roth. And 
though it post-dates Ginsberg, the Court in 
Miller v. California expressly cabined the 
First Amendment concept of obscenity in 
terms of sexual material. 
 
Circuit courts have resisted attempts to 
broaden obscenity to cover violent material 
as well as sexually-explicit material. In 
American Amusement Machine Association 
v. Kendrick, which involved a video game 
restriction that mixed the regulation of 
sexual and violent material, the Seventh 
Circuit discussed why “[v]iolence and 
obscenity are distinct categories of 
objectionable depiction,” explaining that 
obscenity is concerned with “offensiveness,” 
whereas ordinances like the one at issue in 
Kendrick (and here) are concerned with 
conduct or harm. In Video Software Dealers 
Association v. Webster, the Eighth Circuit 
held that videos “that contain[ ] violence but 
not depictions or descriptions of sexual 
conduct cannot be obscene.” Likewise, in 
Eclipse Enterprises, Inc. v. Gulotta, the 
Second Circuit declined to place trading 
cards which depicted heinous crime that was 
allegedly harmful to minors in the category 
of unprotected obscenity. Further, in James 
v. Meow Media, Inc., the Sixth Circuit, in 
discussing excessively violent movies and 
video game material, “decline[d] to extend 
[its] obscenity jurisprudence to violent, 
instead of sexually explicit, material.” 
 
Finally, we note that the Ginsberg Court 
suggested its intent to place a substantive 
limit on its holding. It stated: 
 
We have no occasion in this case to 
consider the impact of the guarantees 
of freedom of expression upon the 
totality of the relationship of the 
minor and the State. It is enough for 
the purposes of this case that we 
inquire whether it was 
constitutionally impermissible for 
New York . . . to accord minors 
under 17 a more restricted right than 
that assured to adults to judge and 
determine for themselves what sex 
material they may read or see. 
 
Though not the clearest of disclaimers, this 
language telegraphs that the Court’s concern 
in Ginsberg was with the relationship 
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between the state and minors with respect to 
a certain subject matter—“sex material” as it 
relates to the interests of minors. 
 
In light of our reading of Ginsberg and the 
cases from our sister circuits, we decline the 
State’s invitation to apply the Ginsberg 
rationale to materials depicting violence, and 
hold that strict scrutiny remains the 
applicable review standard. Our decision is 
consistent with the decisions of several other 
courts that have addressed and rejected the 
argument that the Ginsberg standard be 
extended from the field of sex-based content 
to violence in video games. At oral 
argument, the State confirmed that it is 
asking us to boldly go where no court has 
gone before. We decline the State’s entreaty 
to extend the reach of Ginsberg and thereby 
redefine the concept of obscenity under the 
First Amendment. 
 
V. 
 
Accordingly, we review the Act’s content-
based prohibitions under strict scrutiny. As 
noted above, “[c]ontent-based regulations 
are presumptively invalid,” and to survive 
the Act “must be narrowly tailored to 
promote a compelling Government interest. 
Further, “[i]f a less restrictive alternative 
would serve the Government’s purpose, the 
legislature must use that alternative.” 
 
A. 
 
. . . The State’s focus is on the actual harm 
to the brain of the child playing the video 
game. Therefore, we will not assess the 
Legislature’s purported interest in the 
prevention of “violent, aggressive, and 
antisocial behavior.” 
 
The Supreme Court has recognized that 
“there is a compelling interest in protecting 
the physical and psychological well-being of 
minors.” Notwithstanding this abstract 
compelling interest, when the government 
seeks to restrict speech “[i]t must 
demonstrate that the recited harms are real, 
not merely conjectural, and that the 
regulation will in fact alleviate these harms 
in a direct and material way.” Although we 
must accord deference to the predictive 
judgments of the legislature, our “obligation 
is to assure that, in formulating its 
judgments, [the legislature] has drawn 
reasonable inferences based on substantial 
evidence.” 
 
In evaluating the State’s asserted interests, 
we must distinguish the State’s interest in 
protecting minors from actual psychological 
or neurological harm from the State’s 
interest in controlling minors’ thoughts. The 
latter is not legitimate. . . . 
 
In Kendrick, the Seventh Circuit commented 
on a psychological harm rationale in the 
violent video game context: 
 
Violence has always been and 
remains a central interest of 
humankind and a recurrent, even 
obsessive theme of culture both high 
and low. It engages the interest of 
children from an early age, as 
anyone familiar with the classic fairy 
tales collected by Grimm, Andersen, 
and Perrault is aware. To shield 
children right up to the age of 18 
from exposure to violent descriptions 
and images would not only be 
quixotic, but deforming; it would 
leave them unequipped to cope with 
the world as we know it. 
 
Because the government may not restrict 
speech in order to control a minor’s 
thoughts, we focus on the State’s 
psychological harm rationale in terms of 
some actual effect on minors’ psychological 
health. 
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Whether the State’s interest in preventing 
psychological or neurological harm to 
minors is legally compelling depends on the 
evidence the State proffers of the effect of 
video games on minors. Although the 
Legislature is entitled to some deference, the 
courts are required to review whether the 
Legislature has drawn reasonable inferences 
from the evidence presented. Here, the State 
relies on a number of studies in support of 
its argument that there is substantial 
evidence of a causal effect between minors 
playing violent video games and actual 
psychological harm. 
The State relies heavily on the work of Dr. 
Craig Anderson, pointing to Dr. Anderson’s 
2004 updated meta-analysis called An 
update on the effects of playing violent video 
games. This article states that it “reveals that 
exposure to violent video games is 
significantly linked to increases in 
aggressive behaviour, aggressive cognition, 
aggressive affect, and cardiovascular 
arousal, and to decreases in helping 
behaviour.” Even upon lay review, however, 
the disclaimers in this article, alone, 
significantly undermine the inferences 
drawn by the State in support of its 
psychological harm rationale. First, Dr. 
Anderson remarks on the relative paucity of 
the video game literature and concedes that 
the violent video game literature is not 
sufficiently large to conduct a detailed meta-
analysis of the specific methodological 
features of other studies, many of which 
were themselves flawed. Second, he further 
states that “[t]here is not a large enough 
body of samples . . . for truly sensitive tests 
of potential age difference in susceptibility 
to violent video game effects,” and jettisons 
mid-article his exploration of the effect of 
age differences (i.e., over-eighteen versus 
under-eighteen). It appears that he 
abandoned the age aspect of the study, in 
part, because “there was a hint that the 
aggressive behaviour results might be 
slightly larger for the 18 and over group.” 
He concludes the meta-analysis with the 
admission that there is a “glaring empirical 
gap” in video game violence research due to 
“the lack of longitudinal studies.” 
 
Thus, Dr. Anderson’s research has readily 
admitted flaws that undermine its support of 
the State’s interest in regulating video games 
sales and rentals to minors, perhaps most 
importantly its retreat from the study of the 
psychological effects of video games as 
related to the age of the person studied. 
Although not dispositive of this case, we 
note that other courts have either rejected 
Dr. Anderson’s research or found it 
insufficient to establish a causal link 
between violence in video games and 
psychological harm. 
 
The State also relies on a study of the effects 
of video game violence on adolescents, 
conducted by Dr. Douglas Gentile, which 
studied eighth and ninth graders and 
concluded that “[a]dolescents who expose 
themselves to greater amounts of video 
game violence were more hostile” and 
reported getting into more arguments and 
fights and performing poorly in school. The 
extent to which this study supports the 
State’s position is suspect for similar reasons 
as Dr. Anderson’s work. First, this study 
states that due to its “correlational nature” it 
could not directly answer the following 
question: “Are young adolescents more 
hostile and aggressive because they expose 
themselves to media violence, or do 
previously hostile adolescents prefer violent 
media?” Second, this study largely relates to 
the player’s violent or aggressive behavior 
toward others—which, as noted above, is 
not the interest relied on by the State here—
rather than the psychological or neurological 
harm to the player. Moreover, the study 
glaringly states that “[i]t is important to note 
. . . that this study is limited by its 
correlational nature. Inferences about causal 
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direction should be viewed with caution.” 
Finally, Dr. Gentile’s study suggests that 
“[a]dditional experimental and longitudinal 
research is needed.” 
 
Additionally, the State relies on a study by 
Dr. Jeanne Funk for the proposition that 
video games can lead to desensitization to 
violence in minors. Like the others, this 
study presents only an attenuated path 
between video game violence and 
desensitization. It specifically disclaims that 
it is based on correlation principles and that 
“causality was not studied.” 
 
Finally, the State relies on a two-page press 
release from Indiana University regarding 
the purported connection between violent 
video games and altered brain activity in the 
frontal lobe. The research described, 
conducted in part by Dr. Kronenberger, has 
been criticized by courts that have reviewed 
it in depth. 
 
In sum, the evidence presented by the State 
does not support the Legislature’s purported 
interest in preventing psychological or 
neurological harm. Nearly all of the research 
is based on correlation, not evidence of 
causation, and most of the studies suffer 
from significant, admitted flaws in 
methodology as they relate to the State’s 
claimed interest. None of the research 
establishes or suggests a causal link between 
minors playing violent video games and 
actual psychological or neurological harm, 
and inferences to that effect would not be 
reasonable. In fact, some of the studies 
caution against inferring causation. 
Although we do not require the State to 
demonstrate a “scientific certainty,” the 
State must come forward with more than it 
has. As a result, the State has not met its 
burden to demonstrate a compelling interest. 
 
B. 
Even    if     we    assume    that     the    State 
demonstrated a compelling interest in 
preventing psychological or neurological 
harm, the State still has the burden of 
demonstrating that the Act is narrowly 
tailored to further that interest, and that there 
are no less restrictive alternatives that would 
further the Act. We hold that the State has 
not demonstrated that less restrictive 
alternative means are not available. 
 
Instead of focusing its argument on the 
possibility of less restrictive means, the 
State obscures the analysis by focusing on 
the “most effective” means, which it asserts 
is the one thousand dollar penalty imposed 
for each violation. Specifically, the State 
argues that the ESRB rating system, a 
voluntary system without the force of law or 
civil penalty, is not a less-restrictive 
alternative means of furthering the 
Legislature’s purported compelling interest. 
Acknowledging that the industry has 
implemented new enforcement mechanisms, 
the State nevertheless argues that the ESRB 
does not adequately prevent minors from 
purchasing M-rated games. The State also 
dismisses the notion that parental controls 
on modern gaming systems could serve the 
government’s purposes, arguing that there is 
no evidence that this technology existed at 
the time the Act was passed. 
 
Further, the State does not acknowledge the 
possibility that an enhanced education 
campaign about the ESRB rating system 
directed at retailers and parents would help 
achieve government interests. The State 
appears to be singularly focused on the 
“most effective” way to further its goal, 
instead of the “least restrictive means,” and 
has not shown why the less-restrictive 
means would be ineffective. 
 
Even assuming that the State’s interests in 
enacting the Act are sufficient, the State has 
not demonstrated why less restrictive means 
would not forward its interests. The Act, 
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therefore, is not narrowly tailored. Based on 
the foregoing, and in light of the 
presumptive invalidity of content-based 
restrictions, we conclude that the Act fails 
under strict scrutiny review. 
 
VI. 
 
Finally, we evaluate the constitutionality of 
the Act’s labeling provision, which requires 
that the front side of the package of a 
“violent video game” be labeled with a four 
square inch label that reads “18.” Plaintiffs 
argue that section 1746.2 unconstitutionally 
forces video game retailers to carry the State 
of California’s subjective opinion, a 
message with which it disagrees. The State 
counters that the “labeling provision impacts 
the purely commercial aspect regarding 
retail sales of the covered video games” and, 
under the resulting rational basis analysis, 
the labeling requirement is rationally related 
to the State’s “self-evident purpose of 
communicating to consumers and store 
clerks that the video game cannot be legally 
purchased by anyone under 18 years of age.” 
 
Generally, “freedom of speech prohibits the 
government from telling people what they 
must say.” Commercial speech, however, is 
generally accorded less protection than other 
expression. The Court has upheld compelled 
commercial speech where the state required 
inclusion of “purely factual and 
uncontroversial information” in advertising. 
Compelled disclosures, justified by the need 
to “dissipate the possibility of consumer 
confusion or deception,” are permissible if 
the “disclosure requirements are reasonably 
related to the State’s interest in preventing 
deception of customers. 
 
Ordinarily, we would initially decide 
whether video game packaging constitutes 
separable commercial speech or commercial 
speech that is “inextricably intertwined” 
with otherwise fully-protected speech. That 
analysis would direct what level of scrutiny 
to apply to the labeling requirement. 
However, we need not decide that question 
because the labeling requirement fails even 
under the factual information and deception 
prevention standards set forth in Zauderer. 
Our holding above, that the Act’s sale and 
rental prohibition is unconstitutional, 
negates the State’s argument that the 
labeling provision only requires that video 
game retailers carry “purely factual and 
uncontroversial information” in advertising. 
Unless the Act can clearly and legally 
characterize a video game as “violent” and 
not subject to First Amendment protections, 
the “18” sticker does not convey factual 
information. 
 
Moreover, the labeling requirement fails 
Zauderer’s rational relationship test, which 
asks if the “disclosure requirements are 
reasonably related to the State’s interest in 
preventing deception of customers.” Our 
determination that the Act is 
unconstitutional eliminates the alleged 
deception that the State’s labeling 
requirement would purportedly prevent: the 
misleading of consumers and retailers by the 
ESRB age ratings that already appear on the 
video games’ packaging. Since the Act is 
invalid and, as a result, there is no state-
mandated age threshold for the purchase or 
rental of video games, there is no chance for 
deception based on the possibly conflicting 
ESRB rating labels. In fact, the State’s 
mandated label would arguably now convey 
a false statement that certain conduct is 
illegal when it is not, and the State has no 
legitimate reason to force retailers to affix 
false information on their products. 
 
VII. 
 
We decline the State’s invitation to apply 
the variable obscenity standard from 
Ginsberg to the Act because we do not read 
Ginsberg as reaching beyond the context of 
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restrictions on sexually-explicit materials or 
as creating an entirely new category of 
expression—speech as to minors—excepted 
from First Amendment protections. As the 
Act is a content based regulation, it is 
subject to strict scrutiny and is 
presumptively invalid. Under strict scrutiny, 
the State has not produced substantial 
evidence that supports the Legislature’s 
conclusion that violent video games cause 
psychological or neurological harm to 
minors. Even if it did, the Act is not 
narrowly tailored to prevent that harm and 
there remain less-restrictive means of 
forwarding the State’s purported interests, 
such as the improved ESRB rating system, 
enhanced educational campaigns, and 
parental controls. Finally, even if the Act’s 
labeling requirement affects only 
commercial speech in the form of video 
game packaging, that provision constitutes 
impermissibly compelled speech because the 
compelled label would not convey purely 
factual information. Accordingly, the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment to 
Plaintiffs and denial of the State’s cross-
motion for summary judgment is 
AFFIRMED. 
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“High Court Takes Video Game Case” 
USA Today 
April 29, 2010 
Joan Biskupic 
Taking up a new First Amendment test of 
disturbing images, the Supreme Court 
agreed Monday to hear California’s appeal 
of a decision that struck down a state law 
prohibiting the sale or rental of violent video 
games to minors. 
 
The justices’ decision to accept the case, 
which will be heard in the term that begins 
next fall, comes a week after the justices 
threw out a federal law that swept too 
broadly in banning depictions of animal 
cruelty. The court by an 8-1 vote rejected 
arguments by the federal government that it 
could carve out a new exception to the First 
Amendment—as exists for obscenity—for 
images of animal cruelty, such as 
dogfighting. 
 
In the new dispute, Schwarzenegger v. 
Video Software Dealers Association, 
California officials urge the justices to create 
an exemption for a class of violent videos 
that appeals “to the deviant or morbid 
interest and has no socially redeeming value 
for minors.” 
 
Led by Attorney General Jerry Brown, state 
officials say studies point to “growing 
evidence that these games harm minors.” 
 
Paul Smith, a lawyer who represents 
associations of companies that create and 
sell videos, disputed the danger of the games 
and termed them “a modern form of artistic 
expression. Like motion pictures and 
television programs, video games tell stories 
and entertain audiences.” 
 
The 2005 law, challenged by the Video 
Software Dealers Association and 
Entertainment Software Association, bars 
the sale or rental of “violent” video games to 
minors and calls for fines of up to $1,000. 
 
The law defines a violent game as one that 
depicts “killing, maiming, dismembering or 
sexually assaulting an image of a human 
being” in a way that appeals to a deviant 
interest of minors and lacks “serious literary, 
artistic, political or scientific value.” 
 
As an example of a game the law might 
cover, California officials cited one in which 
“girls attacked with a shovel will beg for 
mercy; the player can be merciless and 
decapitate them.” 
 
A federal appeals court ruled last year that 
the California law was too broadly written 
and that state lawyers had failed to justify 
any First Amendment exception for video 
games. The appeals court questioned the 
connection to psychological harm to youths 
and said, “Even if the state had a compelling 
interest in preventing psychological or 
neurological harm allegedly caused by 
violent video games, the law was not 
narrowly tailored to further that interest.” 
 
In its appeal, California argues that 
“excessively violent material is no more 
worthy of First Amendment protection than 
sexual material” when children are involved. 
The state’s argument relies largely on a 
1968 case, Ginsberg v. New York, that 
upheld restrictions on the sale of sexual 
material to minors. 
 
Smith had countered that the obscenity 
exception to the First Amendment has long 
been confined to sexually explicit, not 
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violent, materials. Regarding video games 
generally, Smith said, “Like great literature, 
games often involve themes such as good vs. 
evil, triumph over adversity, struggle against 
corrupt powers and quest for adventure. 
 
David Hudson, a lawyer at the First 
Amendment Center at Vanderbilt 
University, said the case “gives the court a 
pristine opportunity to explain whether the 
‘harmful to minors’ standard applies outside 
of sex and into violence.” 
 
14 
 
“Supreme Court to Hear Videogames Case” 
The Wall Street Journal 
April 27, 2010 
Brent Kendall
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed 
to decide the constitutionality of a California 
law that seeks to ban the sale of violent 
videogames to minors. 
 
Two lower courts struck down the law as an 
unconstitutional restriction on freedom of 
speech. 
 
How the high court rules could affect 
videogame makers such as Activision 
Blizzard Inc., producer of “Call of Duty,” 
and Take-Two Interactive Software Inc.’s 
Rockstar Games, which makes “Grand Theft 
Auto.” The case could also have 
implications for the broader entertainment 
industry, specifically for producers of 
violent movies and television shows. 
 
Last week the court took a broad view of the 
First Amendment when it struck down a 
federal law banning depictions of animal 
cruelty. The court said the law was too 
sweeping in restricting speech. 
 
California argued in its petition to the 
Supreme Court that lawmakers should be 
able to ban sales of violent videogames to 
those younger than 18 just as they can 
restrict the sale of sexual material to minors. 
 
The state said violent videogames are “a 
new, modern threat to children” that cause 
psychological harm and make minors more 
likely to exhibit violent or aggressive 
behavior. 
 
Two trade associations challenged the law 
before it went into effect, arguing that 
videogames are a modern form of artistic 
expression entitled to First Amendment 
protection. 
 
Michael D. Gallagher, president of the 
Entertainment Software Association, which 
represents U.S. computer-game and 
videogame publishers, said the industry’s 
voluntary rating system has successfully 
informed consumers and parents about the 
games’ content. 
 
Entertainment lawyer Stephen Smith, of the 
Greenberg Glusker law firm in Los Angeles, 
said games rated as “mature,” such as “Call 
of Duty” and “Grand Theft Auto,” are some 
of the industry’s biggest sellers. He said the 
loss of teen customers could make it hard for 
companies to justify large budgets for 
creating and marketing such games. But he 
also said restricting sales wouldn’t be easy 
because many games are purchased and 
played online. 
 
It isn’t clear which games would be affected 
by California’s law, which defines a violent 
video game as one that “includes killing, 
maiming, dismembering or sexually 
assaulting an image of a human being.” 
 
In a statement, California Attorney General 
Edmund G. Brown Jr. said: “It is time to 
allow California’s common-sense law to go 
into effect and help parents protect their 
children from violent video games.” 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision to consider 
the case came as something of a surprise 
because lower courts have been unanimous 
in striking down laws similar to California’s. 
 
A federal trial judge in San Jose and the 9th 
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals each ruled 
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that California didn’t have sufficient 
evidence to support the claim that violent 
videogames harmed minors. The courts also 
said there were other, less restrictive ways to 
prevent minors from playing the games, 
such as parental controls on some gaming 
systems. 
 
The case is Schwarzenegger v. 
Entertainment Merchants Assn., 08-1448. 
Oral arguments will take place during the 
court’s next term, which begins in October. 
 
“This is an important issue with national 
implications, particularly in light of the 
growing evidence that these games harm 
minors and that industry self-regulation 
through the existing rating system has 
proven ineffective,” the state said in its 
petition. 
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“Governor Schwarzenegger’s Video Game Act 
Terminated by the Ninth Circuit” 
JOLT Digest 
February 28, 2009 
Brittany Blueitt 
The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed the order of the 
United States District Court for the Northern 
District of California, enjoining the 
enforcement of an Act that imposed a 
mandatory labeling requirement for all 
“violent” video games and prohibited the 
sale of such games to minors. 
 
The Ninth Circuit held that the Act posed a 
presumptively invalid content-based 
restriction on speech in violation of the First 
Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. The Ninth Circuit also held 
that the Act’s labeling requirement 
constituted unconstitutionally compelled 
speech because it did not require disclosure 
of purely factual information, but required 
the carrying of the State’s opinion as to the 
nature of the video game. In so holding, the 
Court noted that “minors are entitled to a 
significant measure of First Amendment 
protection, and only in relatively narrow and 
well-defined circumstances may government 
bar public dissemination of protected 
materials to them.” 
 
The Wall Street Journal highlights that the 
state, in defending the law, argued that 
violence and sex should be governed by 
analogous prohibitions: the government can 
prohibit the sale of explicit pornography to 
minors, and so it should also be able to limit 
the sale of ultra-violent video games. 
 
Ars Technica notes that should this case 
reach the Supreme Court, it is unlikely that 
the Court will discover anything that the 
court of appeals failed to notice.  
 
California Civil Code §§ 1746-1746.5 (the 
“Act”) restricts the sale of violent video 
games to minors, and imposes a labeling 
requirement on such games. Video Software 
Dealers Association and Entertainment 
Software Association filed for declaratory 
relief seeking to invalidate the Act on the 
grounds that it violated rights guaranteed 
under the First Amendment. The District 
Court granted summary judgment for the 
plaintiffs. 
 
In upholding the District Court’s order and 
striking down the Act, the Ninth Circuit 
declined to “boldly go where no court has 
gone before” by extending the “variable 
obscenity” (“obscenity as to minors”) 
standard set forth in Ginsberg v. New York 
390 U.S. 629 (1968), which upheld the 
prohibition of sale of sexually-explicit 
material to minors that was defined by 
statute as obscene because of its appeal to 
minors. In doing so, the Court restricted 
Ginsberg’s application to sex-based 
expression, not expression containing only 
violent content. After declining to expand 
Ginsberg, the Court reviewed the Act in 
accordance with the presumption of 
invalidity applied to content-based 
restrictions, and finally determined that the 
State’s asserted interest in “preventing 
psychological or neurological harm to 
minors” was insufficient to pass strict 
scrutiny. 
 
According to the Court, the government’s 
interest is compelling only when “the recited 
harms are real, not merely conjectural and [ ] 
the   regulation  will  in  fact  alleviate  these  
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harms in a direct and material way.” The 
Court found the research proffered by the 
State to support its assertion of harm 
insufficient because the research suggested 
only correlation between actual 
psychological harm and violent video games 
and not causation. Furthermore, the Court 
found that even if there was a direct causal 
relationship between the asserted harms and 
violent video games, the State failed to 
demonstrate that the Act was narrowly 
tailored to achieve the State interest. 
 
Turning to the question of labeling, the 
Ninth Circuit noted that although 
commercial speech is accorded less 
protection than other speech, the Court has 
only upheld compelled commercial speech 
where the State required inclusion of “purely 
factual and uncontroversial information.” 
The label required by the Act did not 
provide factual information but rather 
compelled speech concerning the 
government’s opinion about the content of 
the video game. This type of compelled 
speech is cannot pass constitutional scrutiny. 
18 
 
“Why Nine Court Defeats Haven't Stopped States 
from Trying to Restrict ‘Violent’ Video Games” 
 
The Free Expression Policy Project 
August 15, 2007 
Marjorie Heins 
 
The August 6, 2007, decision by U.S. 
District Judge Ronald Whyte striking down 
California’s video game censorship law was 
the ninth such ruling by a federal court in 
the past six years. Yet state and local 
legislators continue to press for laws 
restricting minors’ access to games with 
“violence,” “inappropriate violence,” “ultra 
violence,” or whatever other term they hope 
will ban the games they think harmful. 
 
According to the website Game 
Censorship.com, Delaware, Indiana, Kansas, 
New York, North Carolina, and Utah are 
currently considering legislation restricting 
minors’ access to games with violent 
content. The nine states or localities whose 
laws have been struck down include (in 
addition to California) Indianapolis, St. 
Louis, Michigan, Washington, Illinois, 
Louisiana, Minnesota, and Oklahoma. 
 
Why do lawmakers continue to press for 
censorship of video games despite the clear 
unconstitutionality of the enterprise? The 
answer probably lies in the long history of 
media-violence politics, a history that goes 
back more than a century, to an era when 
concerns that crime and detective magazines 
would corrupt urban youth first led to laws 
banning stories of “bloodshed, lust, or 
crime.” The concern resurfaced in the 1930s, 
once movies captured the national 
imagination, and again in the 1950s when 
television became our dominant mass 
medium, while crime-and-adventure comics 
were accused of causing juvenile 
delinquency. In the 1960s, 70s, and 80s, the 
government liberally funded researchers 
who sought to prove harmful effects from 
gunslinger shows and other televised 
violence, and politicians as well as the 
researchers often misrepresented the dubious 
results of their experiments. 
 
Fast forward to 2000, when four 
professional associations issued a “Joint 
Statement” asserting that “well over 1000 
studies . . . point overwhelmingly to a causal 
connection between media violence and 
aggressive behavior in some children.” The 
Statement was so rife with errors that it was 
difficult to understand how these groups—
which included the American Medical 
Association (the AMA)—could have 
endorsed it. 
 
Dr. Edward Hill, chair-elect of the AMA, 
shed some light on this question the 
following year during a panel discussion. 
Responding to questions about the Joint 
Statement, Dr. Hill explained that it was the 
AMA’s desire for health education funding 
that drove its support of the Joint Statement. 
The AMA is “sometimes used by the 
politicians. We try to balance that because 
we try to use them also, so it’s a contest. . . . 
There were political reasons for signing on. 
We’re looking for a champion in Congress 
that will be willing to back our desire for 
funding for comprehensive school health in 
this country.” 
 
By the late 1990s, violent video games were 
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stirring new concerns. Their interactivity, 
some critics said, increased the risk of 
imitative behavior. Psychologist Craig 
Anderson became a prominent spokesman 
for this view; among his experimental 
findings were that subjects who had played 
violent games in a laboratory administered 
slightly longer “noise blasts” than a control 
group. They also recognized “aggressive 
words” slightly more quickly. (The 
difference was in fractions of a second.) 
Anderson posited that recognizing 
aggressive words reflects aggressive 
thoughts, and that aggressive thoughts lead 
to aggressive behavior. 
 
Anderson’s research may have been squishy, 
but several states and localities relied on it 
between 2000 and 2006 in passing laws to 
restrict minors’ access to video games. St. 
Louis’s ordinance, for example, criminalized 
selling, renting, or otherwise making 
available to minors any “graphically 
violent” video game, or permitting free play 
of such a game without the consent of a 
parent or guardian. The St. Louis County 
Council, before passing the law, heard 
testimony from Anderson that playing 
violent games for 10 to 15 minutes causes 
“aggressive behavior” and “that children 
have more aggressive thoughts and 
frequently more aggressive behavior after 
playing violent video games.” 
 
A federal district court relied on these 
statements in upholding the law, but the 
Court of Appeals reversed, finding the 
County’s conclusions to be “simply 
unsupported in the record.” Anderson’s 
“vague generality” about aggressive 
thoughts and behavior, the judges said, “falls 
far short of a showing that video games are 
psychologically deleterious,” and other 
testimony was equally “ambiguous, 
inconclusive, or irrelevant.” 
 
The judges in the St. Louis case cited a 
decision from a sister court, striking down 
Indianapolis’s ordinance. In that case, the 
court observed that from Grimm’s fairy tales 
to horror movies and epic poems, violent 
themes have been part of children’s 
literature; to shield them from the subject 
“would not only be quixotic, but 
deforming.” Neither Anderson’s “aggressive 
word” and “noise blast” experiments nor any 
other evidence before the court showed that 
video games “have ever caused anyone to 
commit a violent act,” or “have caused the 
average level of violence to increase 
anywhere.” 
 
In the Illinois case, the judge was 
particularly skeptical of expert witness 
testimony from Anderson and another 
psychologist, William Kronenberger. The 
judge noted that Anderson had 
acknowledged exaggerating the significance 
of studies that simply show a correlation 
between aggression and video game play 
(rather than a causative relationship); that 
the longer noise blasts his subjects gave 
after playing violent games were “a matter 
of milliseconds”; and that he had 
manipulated the data and methodology in his 
“meta-analyses.” More credible, the court 
found, were the plaintiffs’ experts, who 
testified that Anderson “not only had failed 
to cite any peer-reviewed studies that had 
shown a definitive causal link between 
violent video game play and aggression, but 
had also ignored research that reached 
conflicting conclusions.” The judge was 
equally unsparing in his dissection of Dr. 
Kronenberger’s testimony that studies of 
adolescent brain activity point to harm from 
violent video games. 
 
None of this means, of course, that some 
violent media might not sometimes reinforce 
violent attitudes in some people, or even, 
occasionally, contribute to violent behavior. 
A lack of proof in court is simply that—a 
lack of proof. It doesn’t mean that the 
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contrary has been proven. Certainly, there 
are isolated instances of direct imitation, and 
certainly, the sadistic or misogynistic ideas 
found in some games are disturbing. As the 
court decisions suggest, though, it’s 
impossible to define what kind of violent 
images are harmful (just as it’s impossible to 
pinpoint or quantify violent entertainment’s 
possibly positive effects in relieving tension 
or processing aggressive feelings in a safe 
way). 
 
The California law was typical in its 
(unsuccessful) attempt to craft a definition 
of “violent video game” that wouldn’t be so 
broad as to encompass the universe of 
historical, sports, fantasy, sci-fi, 
action/adventure, knights-in-armor, 
simulated battlefield, or classic literature 
games. The definition had two parts: it 
banned distribution to minors of games that 
either (1) enable players to inflict virtual 
injury “in a manner which is especially 
heinous, cruel, or depraved,” or that (2) 
“appeal to a deviant or morbid interest of 
minors,” are “patently offensive to 
prevailing standards in the community as to 
what is suitable for minors,” and “lack 
serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value for minors.” 
 
That latter definition was borrowed from the 
familiar three-part test that courts have used 
to condemn sexual material that’s deemed 
“obscene” or “harmful to minors.” But as 
Judge Whyte explained, violent expression 
is generally protected by the First 
Amendment unless the government can 
show a “compelling” reason for its 
suppression; “obscene” sexual expression is 
not. As for the alternative definition 
(“heinous, cruel, or depraved”), he pointed 
out that it “has no exception for material 
with some redeeming value and is therefore 
too broad. The definition could literally 
apply to some classic literature if put in the 
form of a video game.” 
 
Despite the impossibility of drafting a video 
game censorship law that wouldn’t be 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, 
politics will likely continue to drive this 
debate—at least until health professionals, 
legislators, and other policymakers agree to 
unite behind programs of media literacy 
education and genuine violence reduction 
rather than attacking entertainment and 
expression. Action-hero-turned-Governor 
Arnold Schwarzenegger, the defendant in 
the California case, would be an ideal 
candidate to lead such an initiative. 
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“The Court as Mr. Fix-It?” 
The New York Times 
April 30, 2010 
Linda Greenhouse 
Prohibition ended 77 years ago, yet 
Americans have still not kicked the habit of 
trying to fix social problems by banning 
things. 
Half a century ago, the target was true-crime 
novels and magazines, those filled with 
“pictures or stories of criminal deeds of 
bloodshed, lust, or crime,” in the words of a 
New York statute that made it a crime to 
print, sell or even to give away such matter. 
Nineteen other states had similar laws. The 
Supreme Court declared in 1948 that the 
statutes violated the First Amendment’s 
guarantee of free speech, prompting a 
passionate dissent from Justice Felix 
Frankfurter. The former Harvard Law 
School professor complained that the 
majority was thwarting the states’ effort “to 
solve what is perhaps the most persistent, 
intractable, elusive and demanding of all 
problems in society—the problem of crime 
and, more particularly, of its prevention.” 
The notion that reading a novel or magazine 
could turn a decent citizen into a criminal—
or that banning one could make the streets 
safer—sounds preposterous today. So does 
the more recent effort by Nassau County, 
N.Y., to ban the sale to minors of trading 
cards depicting notorious criminals, an 
ordinance that the federal appeals court in 
New York declared unconstitutional in 
1997. 
The latest threat to public safety and morals, 
evidently, is the video game. Bans on the 
sale or rental of violent video games to 
minors are popping up all over the 
country—eight states so far, along with 
several local laws. Every one that has been 
challenged in court has been declared 
unconstitutional. 
So it was baffling this week to find the 
Supreme Court weighing in where it doesn’t 
appear to be needed. The court typically 
takes up only those questions that have 
produced contradictory rulings in the lower 
courts; a “conflict in the circuits” is the 
primary marker of a case the justices deem 
worthy of their attention. Yet the justices 
have agreed to hear California’s appeal of a 
ruling by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit that struck down a state 
law imposing a fine of up to $1,000 for the 
sale or rental of a “violent video game” to a 
person under the age of 18. The 2005 statute 
defines “violent video game” as one that 
“appeals to a deviant or morbid interest of 
minors;” offends community standards; and 
lacks “serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value for minors.” 
This definition mirrors the way the Supreme 
Court defines obscenity, a category of 
expression deemed to lack First Amendment 
protection. But obscenity, as a legal 
category, always has a sexual component. 
California is asking the Supreme Court for a 
new carve-out from the First Amendment, 
for depictions of violence when made 
available to minors. The state “is asking us 
to boldly go where no court has ever gone 
before,” the Ninth Circuit panel observed. 
Maybe the Supreme Court accepted the 
case, Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment 
Merchants Association, simply in order to 
kill the state’s stunningly broad theory in the 
cradle. The Roberts court has been highly 
protective of free speech (too much so, 
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according to critics of the recent campaign 
finance decision, Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission, which invalidated 
limits on corporate political speech). And 
just last week, in United States v. Stevens, 
the court voted 8 to 1 on First Amendment 
grounds to strike down a federal law that 
criminalized “crush videos” and other 
commercial depictions of animal cruelty. 
Or maybe the justices want to spare other 
courts the need to keep reviewing and 
declaring unconstitutional an endless 
assortment of violent-video bans. If so, they 
could hardly do better than simply to adopt 
the opinion that Judge Richard A. Posner of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit wrote in 2001, invalidating 
an Indianapolis violent-video ordinance. It’s 
hard to top the Odyssey or the Divine 
Comedy for gruesome depictions of torture 
and mayhem, Judge Posner said, adding that 
shielding modern children from violent 
imagery “would leave them unequipped to 
cope with the world as we know it.” 
Whatever its motive, the Supreme Court’s 
intervention at this point seems so gratuitous 
that I find it hard to shake the concern that 
some justices may actually think that social 
engineering of this sort may actually do 
some good. If so, let’s hope that the history-
minded conservatives check their history 
before signing on to this latest fad. 
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“A Closer Look at the Parallels between US v. Stevens 
and EMA v. Schwarzenegger” 
 
GamesLaw 
April 21, 2010 
Liz Surette 
 
This article is to supplement [Game 
Politics]’s coverage of US v. Stevens and its 
implications for the game industry. I will 
elaborate on why the Supreme Court refuses 
to analogize depictions of the unlawful 
killing, maiming, wounding, etc. of animals 
to child pornography and why it probably 
will not liken video game violence to it 
either in the pending case EMA v. 
Schwarzenegger. Also, the somewhat less-
discussed basis for the Stevens decision: 
overbreadth of the statute and why the EMA 
law will also likely be found overbroad and 
stricken. 
 
1. Why the Court did not create a new 
category of unprotected speech, and why 
they probably will not do so in EMA 
either. 
 
For those not familiar, First Amendment 
jurisprudence recognizes specific categories 
of speech that are minimally protected or not 
protected at all. If the speech restricted by 
the government, most often by statute in 
First Amendment cases, is outside of those 
specific, narrowly drawn categories, the 
court will apply the Strict Scrutiny test. In 
order to pass Strict Scrutiny, a content-based 
restriction on speech must be narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling government 
interest and use the least restrictive means to 
do so—more on that later. 
 
Here, the Government argues that even 
without historical precedent, new categories 
of unprotected speech can still be created if 
a weighing of the “value of the speech 
against its societal costs” falls more heavily 
on the latter. Because of New York v. Ferber 
(discussed below), the Government suggests 
that such a balancing test can be used to 
create new categories of unprotected speech 
all of the time. 
 
As Chief Justice Roberts pointed out in the 
8-1 majority opinion, to use this “balancing 
test” that the government relies on would 
put at risk of censorship a great amount, if 
not the vast majority, of the ordinary speech 
we make to each other every day because 
much of we say in ordinary conversation has 
little or no “religious, political, scientific, 
educational, journalistic, historical, or 
artistic” value. It is an alarming proposition 
that the states, municipalities, and the 
federal government could ban speech that 
they found objectionable “simply on the 
basis that some speech is not worth it.” He 
goes on to acknowledge that while certain 
categories of speech, such as child 
pornography, have been described as having 
such slight or nonexistent value as to be 
outweighed by societal interests, those 
descriptions are just . . . well, “descriptions” 
and not the actual rationale behind the 
holdings. 
 
In New York v. Ferber, the Supreme Court 
carved out a relatively new category of 
unprotected speech—child pornography. In 
the Stevens opinion, the Court made it quite 
clear that Ferber was very exceptional and 
that states will not be successful in 
analogizing just anything to it in order to 
create new exceptions to First Amendment 
protection. In Ferber, the state had a 
compelling interest in protecting children 
from abuse and the Court further found that 
the market for child pornography is 
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intrinsically related to actual child abuse. 
While it could be argued that the market for 
crush videos is intrinsically related to animal 
cruelty, the Court in Stevens did not say that 
preventing animal cruelty was a compelling 
state interest. (More on that later, too.) I read 
Stevens’ interpretation of Ferber to mean 
that both a compelling state interest and an 
intrinsic relation between the prohibited 
conduct and the restricted speech (which 
could also inform a narrow tailoring 
analysis) are required at the very least to 
create a new category. If we were to apply 
that to the statute at issue in EMA, we may 
have a compelling interest in protecting 
children from psychological harm, but we 
find no causal relationship between video 
game violence and psychological harm to 
children, let alone an intrinsic relation 
between depictions of violence in games and 
violence in reality. I wonder if the Court 
would even go as far as I just did, given that 
it considers Ferber to be very, very, unique. 
 
The balancing test that has been adopted 
was done so by the people in our social 
contract with our government by virtue of 
the First Amendment is as follows: the 
benefits of restricting the government itself, 
in this case its ability to regulate and restrict 
speech, outweigh the costs. Though crush 
videos are disgusting, and some video game 
violence is outright gratuitous and excessive, 
the government cannot simply decide that it 
wants to prohibit certain types of speech 
based on its own whims as to what it finds 
valuable and what if finds harmful. That is 
why the Court will probably not decide that 
virtual depictions of “killing, maiming, 
dismembering, or sexually assaulting an 
image of a human being” are unprotected 
speech in EMA v. Schwarzenegger. 
 
2. Overbreadth—why the “safe harbor” 
exception won’t save the EMA law. 
 
Overbreadth is a common cause of the 
downfall of statutes, particularly in the First 
Amendment context. To put it plainly, a 
statute will be adjudged overbroad, and 
therefore invalid, if it just so happens to 
sweep in speech that the government has no 
right to restrict (even if the government did 
not intend it to), as well as speech that it can. 
The rationale behind invalidating a statute 
for this reason is that a person will decline to 
exercise their right to free speech for fear of 
running afoul of the law—thereby resulting 
in the dreaded chilling effect. 
 
Many statutes of all kinds have “safe 
harbor” provisions—exceptions that are 
written in as an attempt to protect citizens 
against unintended applications of the law. 
For example, it is well settled (see Miller v. 
California) that a law restricting obscenity 
must have a safe harbor because we 
acknowledge that oftentimes patently 
offensive depictions of sex should be 
permitted and are often necessary for 
literary, artistic, educational, or scientific 
purposes, even if the work they are 
contained in appeals to the prurient interest 
when taken as a whole. The safe harbor 
protects such works if they exhibit serious 
value, and so the local bookstore can sell 
erotic literature without fear of prosecution 
even if it cannot sell Hustler. 
 
The law at issue in Stevens contains such a 
clause, which the Government argues should 
save it. Any depiction that has “serious 
religious, political, scientific, educational, 
journalistic, historical, or artistic value” is 
immune from prohibition. However, the safe 
harbor was not enough to alleviate the 
statute’s overbreadth because the word 
“serious” itself actually restricts the amount 
of protection that the safe harbor would give 
to speech that is outside of the crush videos, 
animal fighting (except Spanish 
bullfighting), or other extreme depictions of 
animal cruelty that the law was intended to 
prohibit. In addition to the high standard that 
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the word “serious” implies, there is the 
problem that much speech that is usually 
protected (by default, I might add) simply 
does not have serious religious, political, 
scientific, educational, journalistic, 
historical, or artistic value. The Court uses 
recreational hunting videos as an example of 
how speech that should ordinarily be 
protected would not fall under the safe 
harbor because it is merely “recreational.” 
Also, the Government failed to justify its 
characterization of Spanish bullfighting 
videos as having inherent value and 
reconcile that with its notion that Japanese 
dog-fighting videos (one of which was one 
of the grounds for Stevens’ conviction) do 
not. In short, no reading of the safe harbor 
results in the government banning only the 
speech that it has specifically intended to 
and that is why it is overbroad and invalid. 
We could easily apply these ideas to the safe 
harbor clause in California’s law restricting 
the sale of violent video games to minors. 
The statute exempts from its definition of 
“violent video game” (and therefore from 
the prohibition of sale to minors) games that 
do not “as a whole lack serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value for 
minors.” Again, we can see the burden that 
the word “serious” imposes. All games have 
artistic value, but whether that value is 
“serious” could be debatable in some cases 
depending on what any legislature’s 
definition of “serious” is. Also, as above, 
video games are without question 
“recreational,” and the vast majority of 
recreational speech is protected under the 
First Amendment by default. Even if a game 
does not have serious artistic value, it would 
still be entitled to First Amendment 
protection if it is not obscene (or if 
depictions of graphic violence are not an 
unprotected category of speech, following 
our assumptions above). However, the safe 
harbor would not protect such games from 
restriction and therefore would not be 
sufficient to preserve the statute’s validity. 
 
3. Conclusion and an observation. 
 
In case you skimmed or skipped the wall of 
text (understandable), in sum, the statute at 
issue in EMA v. Schwarzenegger is 
analogous to the one in US v. Stevens and 
will probably be stricken down because the 
Court is loathe to create new categories of 
unprotected speech except in very extreme 
circumstances, and that the statute restricts 
speech that is protected, even if it also 
regulates speech that is unprotected. 
 
I mentioned Strict Scrutiny way back up 
there in the second paragraph of section 
(chapter?) 1. It is interesting to note that the 
3rd Circuit below upheld the striking down 
of the statute in US v. Stevens because it did 
not pass Strict Scrutiny—it found that the 
interest in preventing cruelty to animals was 
not compelling, that the statute was not 
narrowly tailored to serve that interest, and 
that it did not use the least restrictive means 
of doing so. Although the Supreme Court 
opinion struck the law down on the basis of 
overbreadth, the only time that overbreadth 
is mentioned in the 3rd Circuit opinion is in 
a footnote in which it notes that the law only 
“might” be overbroad. What I find most 
fascinating is that, aside from a summary of 
procedural history, there was no mention of 
Strict Scrutiny in the entire majority 
opinion. But all’s well that ends well, I 
suppose. 
 
The Court might choose to address Strict 
Scrutiny in EMA v. Schwarzenegger and 
maybe even overbreadth and vagueness. Not 
to mention the variable obscenity issue that 
would apply if the Court found that graphic 
violence is an unprotected category of 
speech. Time will tell. 
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“Let’s Blast Video Violence” 
The Globe and Mail 
February 20, 2004 
Douglas Gentile 
Snipers. Rape. Cars targeting pedestrians. 
Heads exploding in a shower of gore. 
 
These scenes can all be found in violent 
video games, and this month the Journal of 
Adolescence published several studies 
looking at their effects on youth. I was 
involved in one study (Gentile, Lynch, 
Linder, & Walsh, 2004). After looking at 
more than 600 Grade 8 and Grade 9 
students, we found that playing a lot of 
violent video games was a serious risk factor 
linked with children’s anti-social and 
aggressive behaviour—even after 
controlling for the amount the children play, 
their gender and whether they have naturally 
hostile personalities. Surprisingly, even the 
kids who are not naturally aggressive are 
almost 10 times more likely, if they play a 
lot of violent video games, to get into 
physical fights than kids who do not. 
 
Our study is only one of about 40 peer-
reviewed, published studies that demonstrate 
that playing violent video games increases 
aggressive feelings and behaviours. These 
games are not the Pac-Man and Pong of 
earlier generations; as technology has 
advanced, violent video games have become 
extremely graphic (in Grand Theft Auto: 
Vice City, a man encounters a prostitute, has 
sex and then beats her to death to get his 
money back).  
 
Although such ultraviolent video games 
carry an M (mature) rating, a recent study by 
the American Federal Trade Commission 
found that children can buy them easily. In a 
separate study of nearly 800 Grade 4 to 
Grade 8 kids, 87 per cent of boys reported 
that they play M-rated games, and one in 
five admitted that he had bought an M-rated 
game without parental knowledge.  
 
As the research evidence about the negative 
effects of violent games become more 
compelling, parents, educators, and policy-
makers are increasingly concerned about 
what to do. From my perspective, there are 
three pillars of responsibility: the video-
game industry, the rental and retail industry 
and parents.  
 
The video-game industry must clearly and 
accurately label the content of games, so that 
parents know what they are getting before 
buying. Recently, the authors of a study of 
teen-rated games pointed out that there is a 
“significant amount of content in T-rated 
video games that might surprise adolescent 
players and their parents” (including violent 
sexual themes and drug use). The second 
responsibility of the video-game industry is 
to market its products appropriately. Yet 
advertisements for M-rated games have 
appeared in Sports Illustrated for Kids. It’s 
unfair of the industry to label games as “not 
for kids” while marketing them to children. 
True, the industry has taken steps to reduce 
this, but there is still significant room for 
improvement.  
 
The rental and retail industries also have 
responsibilities. First, they must create 
policies under which children under 17 may 
not buy or rent M-rated games without 
parental permission. Many stores, including 
large chains and superstores, have no such 
policies. Some of those who do don’t 
enforce them. In one sting operation 
conducted by the National Institute on 
Media and the Family, children as young as 
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seven encountered no problems in about half 
of their attempts to buy M-rated games. 
Parents should be able to expect that stores 
won’t allow children access to M-rated 
games—just as they expect movie theatres 
won’t give children access to an R-rated 
movie when parents drop them off at the 
theatre.  
 
The third pillar of responsibility is parents—
who must start by educating themselves 
about the differences among video-game 
ratings (“E” for everyone, “T” for teen, “M” 
for mature) and to learn why it is important 
to pay attention to the ratings. Here is where 
the research is so useful: Studies show that 
both amount and content matter. Children 
who play a lot of video games get poorer 
grades in school. Children who play violent 
games appear to become more aggressive 
over time. 
 
Finally, parents need to act on their 
knowledge. Just as playing violent games is 
what scientists call a risk factor for negative 
outcomes for children, active parental 
involvement in children’s video-game habits 
acts as a protective factor.  
 
Should local, state, province or federal 
governments get involved? 
 
The video-game industry is responsive to 
some parental concerns and to pressure from 
politicians. Still, there probably are areas 
where legislation could be helpful without 
rising to the level of censorship. Just like the 
1996 U.S. Telecommunications Act, which 
mandated that TV shows be rated, new 
legislation could require that the TV, movie, 
and video-game industries create a universal 
rating system so that parents need not learn 
the full alphabet soup of different systems. 
Legislation could also mandate that the 
ratings be administered independently of 
each medium (currently, U.S. TV ratings are 
assigned by the TV networks, movie ratings 
by the Motion Picture Association of 
America, etc.) Legislation might also 
mandate the creation of an independent 
ratings-review board to do research on the 
validity of the ratings and maintain 
standards.  
 
There have been legislative attempts to 
restrict the sale of M-rated games to minors 
in the United States. This approach seems 
reasonable: The video-game industry itself 
acknowledges that these games are not for 
children (hence the M-rating), and legal 
precedent in the United States has 
established that the government has an 
entirely appropriate role in limiting the 
influences and activities to which children 
are exposed. 
 
In my country, state and local authorities 
routinely restrict minors’ access to tobacco, 
guns, pornography, and gambling. In fact, 
the U.S. Supreme Court, in Ginsberg v. New 
York (1968), upheld limiting minors’ access 
to pornography on the basis of whether it 
was “rational for the legislature to find that 
the minors’ exposure to [such] material 
might be harmful.” 
 
The research conducted to date has clearly 
met that test, and shows that, for some 
children, exposure to violent media is 
harmful. Oddly, the video-game industry has 
fought every legislative attempt to restrict 
the sale of M-rated games to minors. That is 
puzzling; it suggests that the industry is 
unwilling to stand behind its own ratings. 
That fact alone makes it clear that parents 
should be very cautious before they buy that 
next “hot” game for their child.  
 
Douglas A. Gentile is director of research at 
the National Institute on Media and the 
Family, and an assistant professor of 
psychology at Iowa State University. 
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“Effects of Violent Video Games” 
Los Angeles Times 
May 3, 2010 
Jill U. Adams 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed last week to 
hear a case on California’s attempt to restrict 
sales of violent video games to minors. Both 
the California lawmakers who approved the 
law in 2005 and the U.S. 9th Circuit Court 
of Appeals judges who overturned the law in 
2009 claimed that scientific research was on 
their side. 
 
Lawmakers and judges aren’t the only ones 
at odds over how to interpret research 
studies. Scientists who study media violence 
and its effects on children also are divided 
on what their results mean. 
 
“It’s a highly polarized research field,” says 
Chris Ferguson, a psychology professor at 
Texas A&M International University in 
Laredo. 
 
A number of studies have shown that 
watching a lot of violence on television or 
playing violent video games such as Grand 
Theft Auto and Manhunt produces 
aggressive tendencies in kids. Rowell 
Huesmann, a professor of communications 
and psychology at the University of 
Michigan in Ann Arbor, says that the 
strength of the evidence is on par with data 
that say smoking cigarettes causes lung 
cancer. 
 
Other researchers pooh-pooh such assertions 
and say that scientific findings have been 
decidedly mixed—with several studies 
finding no effects of violent video games on 
children and teens who play them. 
 
In addition, such critics say, when effects 
are observed in studies, they have little or no 
relevance to psychological states that trigger 
violence in real-life situations. 
 
“When scholars are making some of the 
claims that they make”—such as how 
consistent and strong the evidence is or that 
the size of effects can be compared to the 
link between smoking and lung cancer—
“they are being deeply dishonest with the 
American public,” Ferguson says. 
 
Given these polarized opinions, it’s not 
surprising that parents, especially those 
whose kids want to play the often violent 
video games their friends are playing, 
struggle to sort out what to do. Here’s a 
closer look at whether playing violent video 
games is putting America’s youth at risk. 
 
American children spend plenty of time in 
front of screens, be it playing video games 
or watching television. One estimate says 
kids are playing video games for 13 hours 
each week, on average, and that more than 
75% of teens who play report playing games 
rated M (for mature) by the Entertainment 
Software Rating Board, which often contain 
intense violence, blood and gore. 
 
Research has shown that immediately after 
playing a violent video game, kids can have 
aggressive thoughts, angry feelings and 
physiological effects such as increased heart 
rate and blood pressure. In addition, studies 
that survey large populations of kids on their 
game-playing habits and measure aggressive 
personality traits or self-reported aggressive 
acts—physical fights, arguments with 
teachers—often find an association between 
games and aggression. 
 
And yet, even when a strong correlation is 
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found, researchers cannot say that playing 
violent video games causes such behavior. It 
could be that kids with aggressive 
tendencies gravitate toward playing the most 
violent games. 
 
The most compelling studies are ones that 
track kids over a period of time. For 
instance, a 2008 study published in the 
journal Pediatrics followed 362 third-, 
fourth- and fifth-graders in the U.S. and 
1,231 youths ages 12 to 18 in Japan over a 
single school year. 
 
Early in the school year, kids were asked 
about what games they played and for how 
many hours. The more violent content they 
were exposed to, the more likely subjects 
were to report later in the year that they’d 
been in physical fights. 
 
“Is that every kid? No, it’s not every kid,” 
says study co-author Douglas Gentile, a 
psychology professor at Iowa State 
University in Ames. But the trend was 
statistically significant for both boys and 
girls, he says, and other studies that have 
lasted two years have found similar effects. 
 
These so-called longitudinal studies start, at 
least, to address the what-comes-first 
problem, because they measure game-
playing first and assess aggressive behavior 
later. Still, the approach doesn’t solve the 
problem completely. 
 
For instance, it can miss factors that 
influence violent video game-playing and 
aggressive behavior—absent or abusive 
parents, perhaps. 
 
It is also hard to assess the strength of any 
video game aggression effect because 
exposure to violent games varies so much. 
Gentile says violent video games account for 
about 4% of the differences among kids in 
terms of aggressive behavior. Some 
researchers think the number is higher—
Huesmann puts it at more like 10%. Neither 
number seems very high, but then everyone 
agrees that aggression is a complex human 
behavior that is going to have multiple 
causes. 
 
“Usually when people are violent there’s a 
whole set of converging factors,” Huesmann 
says. “No reputable researcher that I know is 
arguing that media violence or video-game 
violence is the most important factor.” Other 
known factors more strongly linked to child 
aggression are a history of abuse, poverty, 
genetics and personality—and the risk 
climbs higher when several factors are 
present in combination. 
 
Still, Huesmann adds, “what’s really 
irritating is when people say it isn’t a factor 
at all—because the evidence is so 
compelling.” 
 
Ferguson, meanwhile, puts the strength of 
the effect squarely at 0%. He says that 
people are inventing a crisis where there is 
none. 
 
“As video games have become more violent 
and more sophisticated and the sales of 
video games have skyrocketed in the last 
few decades, youth violence has 
plummeted,” he says, citing evidence 
compiled by various federal agencies. 
 
Ferguson—who is not the only scientist 
critical of violent-video-game research but 
may be the most vocal—says some 
researchers cherry-pick data, measuring a lot 
of effects and analyzing only the ones that 
show a difference between kids who play 
violent video games and those who don’t. 
Further, he says, some reviews of the 
scientific literature exclude studies that 
show no effect or, in a few cases, an 
opposite effect (i.e., that consumers of 
media violence showed less aggression). He 
30 
 
published a detailed critique of these issues 
in the March issue of the journal 
Psychological Bulletin. 
 
While researchers and legal types continue 
their row over violent video games, there are 
things parents can do, Gentile says. 
 
Setting limits on the amounts of exposure is 
important, he says—the American Academy 
of Pediatrics recommends that kids’ 
exposure to screen time (meaning TV, 
video, computer and video games) be 
limited to one to two hours a day. And so, 
Gentile adds, is “setting limits on content, 
and talking to kids about what they’re seeing 
and hearing. 
 
“Challenge it and make kids think it through 
critically.” 
 
